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Nontechnical Summary
This paper investigates the implications of investment risks in climate policy induced
investments in developing countries. Emission crediting provides market-based incentives to
invest in climate-friendly (i.e. emission mitigation) projects since emission reductions can be
sold on international permit markets, thus recovering higher initial investment costs. We
provide a quantitative assessment of how investment risks to project-based emission crediting
between industrialized countries and developing countries affect the magnitude and
distribution of economic gains from joint implementation of emission abatement. Based on a
multi-region partial equilibrium model of marginal carbon abatement cost curves, we find that
project-based emission crediting in developing countries drastically reduces the overall costs
for industrialized countries that aim at substantial cutbacks of their business-as-usual emission
levels. At the same time, it provides considerable income to developing countries with larger
low-cost abatement options. The incorporation of country-specific investment risks induces
only small changes to the magnitude and distribution of benefits from project-based emission
trading vis-à-vis a situation where investment risks are absent. Only if investors are highly
risk-averse will the differences in risk across developing countries become more pronounced
and induce a non-negligible shift in comparative advantage from high-risk developing
countries to low-risk developing countries. Although the total amount of emission credits
across all developing countries will distinctly shrink for this case (i.e. domestic abatement
shares in industrialized countries increase), the low-risk developing countries may attract
higher project volumes at the expense of high-risk countries and may also benefit from higher
effective prices per emission credit compared to a simulation without risk. The opposite
applies to high-risk countries. The welfare implications of risk incorporation for industrialized
countries are unambiguously negative. Sensitivity analysis with respect to the magnitude of
investment risks highlights the relevance of risk aspects. When investors go for high safety of
returns and perceive substantial differences in project-based risks across countries, only very
cheap projects in high-risk developing countries will be realized, and the associated benefits
to high-risk countries may fall close to zero, while low-risk developing countries will fare
even better. Our results are supported by empirical evidence on regional imbalances of
activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase of the Kyoto Protocol.
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emission reduction targets. However, cooperation between the industrialized and the
developing world through joint implementation of emission abatement promises substantial
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the implications across developing countries are ambiguous. Whereas low-risk developing
countries attract higher project volumes and benefit from higher effective prices per emission
credit compared to a reference scenario without risk, the opposite applies to high-risk
countries. Sensitivity analysis with respect to higher risk estimates show that shifts in the
comparative advantage of emission abatement against high-risk countries may become
dramatic as only very low-cost mitigation projects will be realized, driving down the
country’s benefits from emission crediting to the advantage of low-risk developing countries.
This result is supported by empirical evidence on regional imbalances of activities
implemented jointly under the pilot phase of the Kyoto Protocol.
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11. Introduction
International climate policy has assigned the leading role in emissions abatement to the
industrialized countries who have assumed historical responsibility for the greenhouse gas
(GHG) problem. Developing countries remain uncommitted to GHG abatement. They argue
that they carry only minor historical responsibility for the increase of global GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere. Before decisions are made that could hinder their economic
growth through restrictions on fossil fuel use, the industrialized countries should first
undertake substantial emission reduction.
This argument, however, is moot. Cooperation between the industrialized and the
developing world through joint implementation of GHG emission abatement promises
substantial economic gains to both parties. As long as the costs for GHG mitigation that
industrialized countries have committed to are lower in developing countries, it makes
economic sense that developing countries undertake abatement projects in return for funds
from industrialized countries which receive emission credits counting to their domestic
emission targets. This basic idea of cost-effectiveness led to the clean development
mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol accommodating project-based emission
reductions in developing countries to exploit the potential for low-cost abatement.
Emission crediting provides market-based incentives to invest in climate-friendly (i.e.
emission mitigation) projects since emission reductions can be sold on international permit
markets, thus recovering higher initial investment costs. With emission crediting, developing
countries could attract larger amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), which is the
dominant long-term resource flow to developing countries with a net volume of 185 bn. USD
in 1999 (World Bank, 2001). FDI generates technology spillovers, contributes to international
trade integration, and fosters human capital formation, all of which accelerates economic
growth as the most potent tool for poverty alleviation in developing countries. The importance
of FDI as an economic development device is highlighted by the fact that the private flow of
FDI overshadows official development assistance (ODA) by a wide margin.1
Many policy makers, hence, consider project-based emission reductions as an important
instrument to promote sustainable development with respect to improved environmental
quality as well as better economic performance of developing countries. Yet, there are
1 Official development assistance amounted to only around 41 bn. USD in 1999 (OECD, 2002).
2concerns that the potential benefits of project-based abatement measures may be substantially
reduced by risk concerns of investors associated with abatement projects in developing
countries. In addition, the uneven distribution of investment risks and abatement possibilities
could produce a (politically undesired) shift in comparative advantage of emission abatement
stacked against least-developed countries that typically bear high investment risks and dispose
of rather limited abatement possibilities due to low emission levels (Wirl et al., 1998).
Climate-friendly investment would then mirror the uneven spread of conventional FDI to
developing countries.
The objective of this paper is to provide quantitative insights into the relative
importance of risk preferences to project-based emission crediting with developing countries.
To what extent do risk considerations reduce the potential for cost savings to industrialized
countries? What are the implications of risk for the magnitude and distribution of benefits
from project-based emission trading among developing countries? So far, quantitative
estimates in the literature on the economic impacts of comprehensive emission trading across
countries – the so-called ‘where’-flexibility - have been abstracting from risk considerations
(see overviews in Weyant, 1999; IPCC, 2001). Based on simulations with a simple partial
equilibrium model of emission trade, our key insights can be summarized as follows:
(i) Project-based emission crediting in developing countries drastically reduce the overall
costs for industrialized countries that aim at substantial cutbacks of their business-as-
usual GHG emission levels. At the same time, it provides considerable income to
developing countries with larger low-cost abatement options.
(ii) Incorporation of country-specific investment risks induces only small changes to the
magnitude and distribution of benefits from project-based emission trading vis-à-vis a
situation where investment risks are absent. Only if investors are highly risk-averse will
the differences in risk across developing countries become more pronounced and induce a
non-negligible shift in comparative advantage from high-risk developing countries to
low-risk developing countries. Although the total amount of emission credits across all
developing countries will distinctly shrink for this case (i.e. domestic abatement shares in
industrialized countries increase), the low-risk developing countries may attract higher
project volumes at the expense of high-risk countries and may also benefit from higher
effective prices per emission credit compared to a simulation without risk. The opposite
3applies to high-risk countries. The welfare implications of risk incorporation for
industrialized countries are unambiguously negative.
(iii) Sensitivity analysis with respect to the magnitude of investment risks highlights the
relevance of risk aspects. When investors go for high safety of returns and perceive
substantial differences in project-based risks across countries, only very cheap projects in
high-risk developing countries will be realized, and the associated benefits to high-risk
countries may fall close to zero, while low-risk developing countries will fare even better.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes alternative
approaches to capture investment risks. Section 3 gives a brief non-technical summary of the
partial equilibrium model underlying our simulation analysis, illustrates the potential
implications of risk accounting, and describes empirical estimation as well as model
implementation of investment risks. Section 4 discusses policy scenarios and results. Section
5 presents a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. Investment Risks in Project-Based Emission Crediting
The clean development mechanism can be characterized as a baseline-and-credit regime under
which emission credits for industrialized countries relate to emissions reductions achieved by
eligible GHG mitigation projects in developing countries (Sorrell and Skea, 1999; Janssen,
2000). Emission reductions are calculated by comparing the actual emissions of a project with
the emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the relevant project, i.e. the
reference scenario or baseline. CDM projects involve cross-border investments by
industrialized countries in order to generate emission credits for subsequent sale on
international credit markets or for transfer emission credits (Grubb et al., 1999). Private
investors treat abatement projects in the same manner as ‘conventional’ projects.2 The
investor provides debt and equity financing of the mitigation project in exchange for the
claims on the project and the net cash flow it produces (financial return). Emission credits
from emission reduction contribute to the net cash flow. Hence, the sale of permits from
2 Investment decisions made by private firms are especially climate-relevant in the building, industrial, transport,
and energy sectors. One of the leading infrastructure sectors in attracting private investment is electricity
generation, with total private investments of 131 bn. USD between the years 1990 and 1997 (Zhang and
Maruyama, 2001).
4climate-friendly projects makes it possible to recover higher-investment costs of mitigation
projects vis-a-vis ‘conventional’ projects.
The return on the investment is influenced by several factors that can not be controlled
by the investor. Drawing on the literature on foreign direct investment, Janssen (2002)
distinguishes three main categories of risk that can affect the performance of project-based
emissions crediting: (i) technological risks that are tied to the process of production and refer
to uncertain output quantities; (ii) economic risks that refer to uncertain input and output
prices; and (iii) political risks that arise from uncertainty about property rights on the assets of
the revenue streams and involve tax changes or, as the most drastic example, expropriation.
Potential investors interested in participating in emissions reduction projects taking place in
developing countries may hesitate because of these investment risks. There are high barriers
for finding appropriate financing especially for ‘typical’ projects that are small or medium-
sized, located in a developing country, and dependent on new or innovative technologies or
processes. Further, market prices for emission reductions from climate-friendly investment
are uncertain. Finally, risk factors are determined by country specific considerations.
Investors will seek host developing countries that are politically and economically stable. In
addition, these countries should have a sound institutional framework, a reliable public
infrastructure (energy, water, transport) and the capacity to receive and support international
investments.3
Among the developing countries, especially African countries (excluding South Africa)
failed to attract inward FDI in recent decades, even though gross returns on investment have
been very high. The reasons are the significant risks of capital losses, most importantly
macroeconomic instability, loss of assets due to the non-enforceability of contract, and
physical destruction caused by armed conflicts (OECD, 2002). Risk diversification by
investors may be achieved via investments in different countries, technologies and project
types. For our analysis, we assume that the risks in emission crediting are predominantly
country-specific, i.e. the variations in the profits of single projects are mainly due to the
economic or political conditions in the project’s host countries.
3 Instead of building their own diversified portfolio of projects, investors could invest indirectly in a portfolio of
projects through investment vehicles offered by financial institutions. One of the few examples for carbon
funds is the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF). Investors in the PCF are private companies such as
Gas de France, Deutsche Bank and Mitsubishi, as well as the governments of Canada, Finland, The
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
5Investors invest in ‘conventional’ projects that yield a return greater than the minimum
acceptable hurdle rate, i.e. the return on a risk-free investment plus a risk premium. In
contrast, investors will undertake investments induced by domestic emission limitations as
long as their perceived return is positive, i.e. the price received for the emission credit sold on
international permit markets is higher than the associated (risk adjusted) marginal abatement
cost in the project’s host country. Below, we first provide the optimal investment rule in the
absence of investment risks (Section 2.1). We then present different approaches to how risk
characteristics can be incorporated, i.e. affect the optimal investment rule (Section 2.2).
2.1 Emission Crediting in the Absence of Investment Risks
Investors will engage in project-based emission crediting and choose a single risk-free project
in country i if
iY = i
i
p c
c
′
−
′
> 0 (1)
where Yi is the profit per dollar invested in one unit of emission credits, p is the price received
for the emission credit and ic ′ = ( )i ic q′ are the marginal costs of financing unit abatement in
country i, which depends on the quantity of abatement undertaken qi.
2.2 Emission Crediting with Investment Risks
Omission of risk aspects may significantly overestimate the potential benefits from emission
crediting. Obviously, investors will demand a higher rate of return, i.e. a risk premium, for
risky projects, compared to risk-free options. We capture country-specific risks of emission
crediting through a random variable iτ that quantifies the fraction of the generated credits that
drop out. Accounting for country-specific risks, the return from the investment in a single
project in country i is given by:
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where iX is a random variable, since iτ is random, with expected monetary value iEX ,
variance ( )iV X and standard deviation iXσ .4
2.2.1 Mean-value criterion (µ)
If investors are risk-neutral they aim at maximizing their return from abatement investments,
disregarding the associated risk levels. Accordingly, they judge risky projects solely by their
expected return. The decision rule for abatement investments in a single project becomes
iEX > 0. (3)
However, investors in unique choice situations usually not only care about the expected return
of the investment project but also about the return volatility, which indicates the investment
risk. The overwhelming majority of financial models assumes investors to be risk averse, i.e.
they have a cautious attitude in the context of reasonable decision making.
The risk aspect of the decision problem does not vanish if we take into account the
possibility that project-based emission crediting in country i comes about by summing up the
incomes of various non-rival subprojects that are carried out at the same time by the investors,
i.e. the private companies in industrialized countries or the industrialized countries
themselves.5 However, the bundling of projects in large host countries could significantly
reduce the risks of CDM investments and bring them down to the country-specific risks. To
4 This holds independent of the responsibility for non-compliance, i.e. under seller beware or buyer beware
liability.
5 The Law of Large Numbers implies that in the case of stochastic independence of the single projects, the
average gain converges stochastically towards the expected gain from the single performance as the number of
performances approaches infinity. Following this criterion, the choice of a single project may be based on the
mean-value criterion in the case of multiple risks. However, the conditions of the Law of Large Numbers are
not satisfied in our context, since the number of projects is not sufficiently large and – most importantly - the
different projects are not stochastic independent. The part of the variance that is caused by factors that are
common to all single projects can not be eliminated by increasing the number of contracts pooled (Sinn 1989).
While technological risks of the individual projects might be considered as stochastically independent,
economic and political risks are mostly country specific. The netting-out of dispersions thus does not take
place for the country risks.
7this end, carbon funds not only serve as vehicles for channeling investments, but also as risk
reduction devices (Janssen, 2002). The risk premia for emission projects may hence be based
on risk premia for investment projects in these countries, which we capture through the use of
interest rate spreads (see Section 2.4).
There are different approaches to manage and control risk. In our empirical assessment
we adapt two of them to adjust the investment decision rule and allow for the cost of risk-
bearing: the mean-variance (µ-σ) approach which dominates portfolio theory (Markowitz,
1952)6 and the value at risk (VaR) approach which is a method widely used by banks and
financial firms (Jorion, 2001).
2.2.2 Mean-variance decision criterion (µ,σ)
Under the mean-variance criteria the investment rule becomes
iEX – ( )2 iV X
α
⋅ > 0. (4)
The mean-variance decision function is consistent with the expected utility principle if the
investor’s utility function u is of the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) type and defined
over normally distributed monetary consequences Xi. In this case, it is equal to the cash
equivalent of the project return iEX – iπ , where π describes the risk premium, i.e. the
maximum part of the expected return that the investor is prepared to forfeit in order to avoid
the risk associated with the investment.7
Empirical findings on risk attitudes are rare and depend to a large extent on the specific
method used. Therefore, we study a wide range of values for α , namely α ∈ [ ]0;25 . This
6 Portfolio diversification of carbon abatement options as proposed by Springer (2002) requires the assumption
of constant marginal abatement costs to derive expected returns from marginal abatement curves. Since this
assumption does not seem plausible, we do not follow the portfolio approach.
7 For small risks, the risk premium can be approximated by iπ = ( ) ( )1 2 i ir EX V X⋅ ⋅ , where
( )ir x = ( ) ( )i iu x u x′′ ′− ∀ xi is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of (local) absolute risk aversion (ARA) (Pratt 1964,
Arrow 1965). If the decision maker’s utility function has the form ( )iu x ~ ixe α− ⋅− (negative-exponential),
where ~ denotes equality except for change of utility scale, then the decision maker has constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) with ( )ir x =α, i.e. absolute risk aversion is not affected by the level of ix (Pratt et al.
1995).
8range is consistent with studies in financial economics which assume investors with mean-
variance preferences and absolute risk aversion (Aït-Sahalia and Brandt, 2001; Alexander and
Baptista, 2002). A slightly risk-averse agent may be characterized through α = 2, a moderate
risk-averse agent through α = (5, 10), and a highly risk-averse agent through α = 25.
2.2.3 Value at Risk decision criterion (VaR)
Another method to analyze the risk-return trade-off in investments is the Value at Risk (VaR)
approach. The concept of VaR as a measure of risk was first proposed by Baumol (1963) and
is associated to ‘safety first models’ initially analyzed by Telser (1955). More recently, it
became popular in financial economics. For example, the Basel Capital Accord requires
internationally active banks to determine the minimum regulatory capital in support of their
trading portfolios by using the VaR approach (Santos, 2001).
The VaR indicates the greatest potential loss of a position (or a portfolio) with a
stochastic rate of return iX one expects to suffer over a given time interval within a given
confidence level t (Jorion, 2001). VaR is usually defined as the dollar loss relative to the
mean:
iVaR = iEX –
*
iX , (5)
where *iX is the lowest return at the given confidence level t called the sample quantile of the
distribution.8 The decision criterion under the VaR approach is given by:
iVaR = iEX – iXβ σ⋅ > 0., (6)
where in the case of a normal distribution of the return β is such that ( ) ( )1 tβΦ − = − with
( ).Φ being the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Without any distributional
8 The probability of a lower value than *iX is therefore ( )1 t− = ( )*i iP x X< = ( )*i iX X i if x dx
−∞
 , with iXf being
the probability density function of the investment return iX . The computation of the VaR simplifies
considerably if the distribution of the return is assumed to be normal. In this case, the problem of finding a
VaR is equivalent to finding the deviate β such that the area under the standard normal probability density
function to the left of it is (1 - t).
9assumption imposed on the investment return, a useful lower bound on the VaR is provided
by Chebyshev’s inequality which yields t = ( )21 1 β− .9 For example, the Chebyshev lower
bound on the VaR for a confidence level of t = 0.90 (0.95) is iEX – 3.16 iXσ⋅
( )4.47 ii XEX σ− ⋅ , whereas under normality the VaR is iEX – 1.28 iXσ⋅ ( )1.65 ii XEX σ− ⋅
(Alexander and Baptista, 2002).
3. Analytical Framework and Parameterization
Below, we first provide a description of the partial equilibrium model of permit trading with
investment risk and its parameterization (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 illustrates the intuition how
investment risks change the optimal pattern of abatement across regions. Finally, in Section
3.3 we describe how investment risks of CDM projects can be estimated using interest-rate
spreads between countries and how investment risks are implemented in our model.
3.1 A Model of Permit Trade with Investment Risks
To quantify the economy-wide implications of risk consideration in multilateral emission
crediting, we make use of a partial equilibrium model for permit trade (see Böhringer and
Löschel, forthcoming; Löschel and Zhang, 2002). The analysis below is based on marginal
abatement cost curves for 13 regions. These curves capture the marginal cost of reducing
carbon emissions by different amounts within an economy. Marginal costs of abatement may
vary considerably across countries due to differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price
levels, and the ease of carbon substitution possibilities.
Each country i‘s compliance costs to some exogenous target level ti equal the sum of
abatement costs, resource costs from investment failure, and the costs of buying carbon
permits. The single country’s optimization problem can be stated as:
( ) ( ) ( )min
i
i i i i i i iq
c q r q p e q t+ + ⋅ − − (7)
9 The Chebyshev inequality is ( ){ }ii i XP X EX β σ− ≥ ⋅ ≤ ( ) 2i iX Xσ β σ ⋅  .
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s.t. qi ≥ 0
where qi are the emission reductions, ci denotes the abatement cost function for reducing
carbon emissions, ri quantifies the costs from investment risks (ri = 0 for industrialized
countries), ie stands for the business-as-usual emissions, ti denotes the emission target level
(i.e. a country's initial endowment of permits), and p is the permit price taken as exogenous.
The quantity of permits traded is given by i i ie q t− − .
The first-order condition for the cost minimization problem is given by:
( ) ( )' 'i i i ic q r q p+ = (8)
In the optimum, countries abate emissions up to a level where their marginal abatement costs
plus marginal investment risk are equal to the permit price. The marginal abatement costs
experienced by industrialized countries that demand emission permits from project-based
abatement, exceed the marginal abatement costs experienced by developing countries by the
amount of the marginal costs from investment risk. Total costs of reducing emissions to the
overall target level are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting cost differences in
abatement across countries are taken.
The empirical specification of the costs from investment risks and their concrete
implementation for different risk attitudes is described in Section 3.3. For the regional
marginal abatement costs curves, we adopt a constant elasticity function of the form:
( )' ii i i ic q q δχ= ⋅ (9)
In order to determine the coefficients χ and δ, we employ a least-square procedure based on a
sufficiently large number of discrete observations for marginal abatement costs and the
associated emission reduction in each region. These values stem from the world energy
system model POLES (Criqui et. al., 1996), which embodies a detailed bottom-up description
of regional energy markets and world-energy trade. Table 1 summarizes the countries and
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regions in the model, their baseline emissions in the year 201010 and the least-square estimates
for the coefficients of marginal abatement cost curves.
Table 1 Model dimensions and data
Countries and Regions Emissions a FDI b χ δ
Industrialized World
AUN Australia and New Zealand 130 0.675 1.442
CAN Canada 165 1.567 1.379
CEA Central European Associates 209 0.316 1.388
EUR Europe (EU15 and EFTA) 1,040 0.114 1.369
FSU Former Soviet Union (incl. Ukraine) 593 0.046 1.482
JPN Japan 330 0.718 1.338
USA United States 1,809 0.020 1.427
Developing World
AFR Africa 294 7,949 0.366 1.231
ASI Other Asia 655 18,189 0.295 1.231
CHN China 1,131 38,753 0.022 1.280
IND India 351 2,169 0.452 1.201
MPC Mexico and OPEC 531 1,461 0.546 1.269
MSA Middle and South America 394 3,893 0.299 1.456
a Baseline emissions in MtC in the year 2010 based on DOE (2001) reference case.
b Inward FDI flows to developing countries in millions USD in the year 1999 (World Bank, 2001).
3.2 Economic Effects of Investment Risks
Figure 1 illustrates the central effects of investment risks on the emission credit market in a
simple three-country partial equilibrium framework. The effects are similar to those of
transaction costs (Stavins, 1995).11 There is some industrialized country that faces total
abatement requirement of T. It can fulfill its obligations by either domestic abatement or by
investments in abatement projects abroad. The demand curve D for emission credits from
abroad is determined by the marginal abatement cost curve of the industrialized country. On
the other hand, there are two (unrestricted) project host countries with marginal abatement
10 In our comparative-static simulations we employ 2010 as the target year for emission reduction commitments
by industrialized countries. The marginal abatement cost curves generated by the POLES model are also
based on bottom-up data for 2010.
11 Transaction costs in pollution allowance trading may arise from a variety of activities associated with market
exchange, e.g. search and information acquisition, bargaining over prices, and negotiation, monitoring and
enforcement of contracts (Stavins, 1995). In our analysis we abstract from such transaction costs. Note that
investment risks are sometimes considered as transaction costs in a broader use that covers any policy-related
costs other than the conventionally measured economic adjustment responses (Krutilla, 1999).
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cost functions 'ic (i = 1,2) that yield the total supply S of emissions generated through
projects.
In the absence of investment risks, the industrialized country demands emission credits
generated through projects as long as the price for the credits is below its marginal abatement
costs. In the market equilibrium, marginal abatement costs are equalized at price p across
domestic abatement activities undertaken in the industrialized country and projects abroad
that are hosted in the developing countries. The total amount of emission credits generated by
projects abroad is q = 1q + 2q , with 1q representing projects undertaken in country 1 and 2q
projects undertaken in country 2, respectively. In the cost-effective solution, the industrialized
country purchases credits q and abates domestically T – q.
Investment risks are real resource costs and lead to a different equilibrium than in the
absence of investment risks, where marginal abatement costs are equalized across all regions
in equilibrium. It is still cost effective, but involves greater aggregate compliance costs than
the cost-effective solution in the absence of investment risks. If investment risks associated
with abatement projects are taken into account as described in (3), the investment decision is
governed by the risk-adjusted marginal abatement costs 'ic = ( )( ) '1 1 i icτ− ⋅ , which is the
effective permit supply curve facing permit demanders. We assume that only investments in
country 2 are risky and induce a shift of its effective supply curve in the investor’s perspective
from '2c to
'
2c . Rather than equilibrating marginal abatement costs as is done in the absence of
investment risk, the sum of marginal abatement costs and marginal investment risks are
equalized. Investment risks raise the costs for the participants in permit trade and thereby
unambiguously decrease the volume of permit trading. The new market equilibrium with
investment risks is characterized by a higher credit price p which decreases the purchase of
emission credits (i.e. the industrialized country’s abatement investments) from abroad to q
and increases domestic abatement of the industrialized country to T – q . Hence, investment
risks abroad shift the comparative advantage to domestic actions. In addition, the amount of
investment projects in the more risky country 2 decreases ( )2 2q q−  while more projects are
undertaken in the less risky country 1 ( )1 1q q− reflecting a shift in comparative advantage
towards the less risky host country.
13
Overall, the potential efficiency gains from permit trade are reduced under risk
accounting vis-à-vis a situation where risk is neglected. The true costs of control are higher
with investment risks. This stems partly from the resource costs from investment risks and
partly from the suppression of permit trade that has been mutually beneficial in the absence of
investment risks. The burden from investment risk considerations is unevenly shared between
permit demanders and high- and low-risk permit suppliers. The benefits from emission
crediting for the industrialized countries and higher risk host countries decrease, whereas low-
risk host countries may gain compared to the ‘no-risk’ situation. Industrialized countries are
unambiguously worse off compared to a situation characterized by the absence of investment
risks. The industrialized countries have to do more abatement domestically and pay higher
prices on the permit market. The increase in compliance costs for the industrialized country in
Figure 1 equals the area EHIR. It is composed of higher abatement costs (HIJ) and higher
costs of permit imports (EHJR) from both no-risk country 1 (EFNR) and high-risk country 2
(EGLR). The no-risk host country 2 is unambiguously better off since it enjoys higher profits
from permit trade (EFQR). The effects of investment risks on risky countries such as country
2 are ambiguous. On the one hand, they profit from higher permit prices (EGMR), on the
other, hand the trading volume is reduced and they have to bear the resource costs from
investment risks (MK0). As with the tax incidence, the overall effects depend on the
elasiticities of the marginal abatement cost functions, which determine the share of the
resource costs from emission crediting that can be passed on to industrialized countries as an
increase in the price of permits. In general, the burden from investment risks falls more
heavily on the countries with relatively steep marginal abatement cost curves.
Figure 1 illustrates the important point that industrialized countries ignoring investment
risks of project-based emissions crediting overestimate the potential cost savings from credit
trading, i.e. the desirable level of investment abroad, and misallocate investments across
project-host countries with different risk levels. High-risk countries receive less investments
than in the absence of investment risks, low-risk countries receive more investments.
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Figure 1 Effects of investment risks
3.3 Estimation of Investment Risks and Implementation
The default risk premium, i.e. the higher rate of return investors will demand for risky
projects compared to risk-free options, reflects the market’s assessment of country and project
risk. To estimate risk premia at both the country and project level, different techniques may be
applied, e.g. econometric analysis of past projects (Dailami and Leipziger, 1999). Saini and
Bates (1984) give an overview over various methods for the analysis of country-specific
investment risk, which is the predominant risk category in mitigation projects. They hence
provide a lower bound estimate of the risk involved in project investment. One indicator of
country risks are sovereign debt ratings determined by both political factors (degree of
democratization, integration with world economy, security risks) and economic factors (per
capita GDP, growth prospect, public debt, price stability, balance of payment flexibility,
external debts). These are provided by international rating agencies, such as Standard & Poors
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Corporation and Moody's Investors Service.12 Another established approach is the use of the
interest rate spread. Several studies have shown that interest rate spreads between bonds carry
substantial information for determining country risk (e.g. Edwards, 1986).
For our analysis, we employ bond yield spreads between long-term government
bonds of the developing country i where the emission abatement project is located (risky
country) and the US (as a risk-free reference country) to determine the developing country’s
risk premium iτ . The calculation of country-specific investment risks is based on data from
the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) (IMF, 2000). IFS
provides time series data for key economic indicators of most IMF members (over 200
countries), such as a country's exchange rates, international liquidity, money and banking
accounts, interest rates, production indices, prices, international transactions, government
accounts, and national accounts, as well as commodity and trade statistics. The data on long-
term government bond yields that we use to measure the investment risk is given in monthly
steps from 1981 to 2001. In order to aggregate the single country level data to the regions of
our simulation model (see Table 1), the long-term government bond yields are weighted with
the country’s share in direct investments of the associated region. The descriptive statistics of
the country-specific risk premiums for the model regions with a mapping of IFS countries are
given in Table 2. The expected risk premium iEτ and the variance ( )iV τ are approximated
by the sample mean and variance, respectively. Using this information, the expected return of
investment projects in country i, its variance and standard deviation are given by:
iEX = ( )1 i i iE p c cτ ′ ′− ⋅ −   , ( )iV X = ( ) ( )2i ip c V τ′ ⋅ , and iXσ = ( ) iip c τσ′ ⋅ , where iτσ
denotes the standard deviation of the yield spread.
For example, if the expected value of the yield spread of the country i (where the project
is undertaken) amounts to iτ = 0.1, the investing industrialized country obtains on average
only 90 percent of the emission credits from projects carried out in this country due to the
investment risk. The expected return for the marginal investment project that delivers one
emission credit at price 'ic = 40 USD and saves abatement costs of p = 50 USD in the
12 Moody's long-term bond rating classifications range from Aaa (the best) to C (the worst). The default spreads
for different countries associated with the bond ratings are e.g. 4.5 % for Brazil (B1), 0.95 % for China (A3),
7.5 % for Cuba (Caa1), 3% for India (Ba2), and 6.5 % for Indonesia (B3) (Damodaran, 1999).
16
industrialized country is iEX = 0.19 with investment risk and iY = 0.25 without investment
risk considerations. If the variance of the country-specific risk premium is assumed to be
( )iV τ = 0.01 (i.e. the standard deviation amounts to iτσ = 0.10) the variance of the project
return is ( )iV X = 0.016, and the standard deviation is iXσ = 0.125.
We implement the different attitudes towards risk as described in Section 2.2
through explicit constraints on the ratio of the price received for the emission credit over the
marginal costs of the project generating the credit unit in country i, i.e. ip c ′ . For the
different risk attitudes, an investment in emission reduction projects is profitable as long as:
i
p
c ′
≥ 1
1 iEτ−
(µ) (10)
i
p
c ′
≥
( ) ( )
( )
21 1 2i i i
i
E E V
V
τ τ α τ
α τ
− − − − ⋅ ⋅
⋅
(µ,σ) (11)
i
p
c ′
≥ 1
1
ii
E ττ β σ− − ⋅
(VaR) (12)
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of changes in the risk aversion parameters α under (µ,σ)
preferences and β under VaR preferences on the price-cost-ratio of emission crediting
between the industrialized world and the developing regions represented in our model. The
ratio under µ and VaR preferences coincide for certain values of α and β, e.g. the ratio for
developing region MSA is 1.1 for α = 11.9 and β = 0.44 (t = 0.67). In case α = β = 0 the
investment rule for µ and VAR preferences coincide with equation (10). The price-cost ratio
increases faster in α and β for countries with relatively high variance of returns, such as AFR,
MSA or CHN, while the ratio increases only slightly for countries with relatively low
variance, i.e. ASI, MPC, IND. The basic message of Figure 2 is that risk aversion can
substantially exacerbate the differences in attractiveness of investment projects across host
countries. The increasing perceived costs associated with investment risks enlarge the
departure of the equilibrium with investment risk from the equilibrium in the absence of
investment risk and drive up the total aggregate compliance costs.
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Figure 2 Price-cost-ratios for different risk aversion coefficients
4. Scenarios and Results
For our central case simulations, we assume a uniform 20 % cutback requirement of carbon
emissions across industrialized countries vis-à-vis the business-as-usual emission level in
2010 (see Table 1) while developing countries remain uncommitted. This setting reflects two
key ideas of international climate policy: Firstly, long-term stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at levels recommended by the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2001) requires substantial emission cutbacks compared to the
business-as-usual. Secondly, international climate policy has assigned the leading role in
emissions abatement to the industrialized countries who have assumed historical
responsibility for the greenhouse gas problem.13
To provide a meaningful basis of comparison, we first investigate a set of three
scenarios that reflect different degrees in where-flexibility while abstracting from risk
considerations:
NTR Industrialized countries apply carbon taxes that are high enough to meet their
domestic emission abatement targets (equivalently they may establish a domestic
tradable permit system).
13 The Kyoto Protocol, which has originally been drafted along these lines, has meanwhile stripped down to a
symbolic policy (Böhringer, 2002) and, thus, does not provide a useful reference scenario for our analysis.
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CLUB Industrialized countries can trade emission rights with each other but are not
allowed to purchase project-based emission credits from developing countries.
GLOBAL There are no restrictions to where-flexibility. Beyond trading emission rights
among each other, industrialized countries can buy emission credits from
developing countries through abatement projects. Investment risks are neglected.
A second set of scenarios extends the specification of the GLOBAL scenario by
alternative risk attitudes of investors towards CDM projects in developing countries:14
µ Investors are risk-neutral and discount emission credits purchased through CDM
projects with the mean risk value of the developing country where projects are
undertaken.
(µ,σ) Investors adopt the mean-variance criterion. Covering the wide range of possible
Arrow-Pratt coefficients, we choose a lower bound value (α=10) to characterize a
risk-averse agent and an upper bound value (α=25) to characterize a highly risk-
averse agent.
VaR Investors behave according to the Value at Risk (VaR) criterion. Without any
distributional assumption imposed, we select two alternative values for β that
correspond to a confidence level of either 0.75 (i.e. β = 2) or 0.94 (i.e. β = 4).15
Table 3 reports the simulation results for the first set of scenarios.16 Without emission
trading (scenario NTR), each industrialized country has to meet its reduction target
exclusively by domestic action. The associated marginal abatement costs per ton of carbon
range from 55 USD for FSU up to 195 USD for CAN. Given the same relative reduction
target, differences in marginal costs across countries can be traced back to cross-country
differences in energy and carbon intensities, initial energy prices17 or the ease of carbon
substitution through fuel switching or energy savings as embodied in the respective marginal
abatement cost curves. Compliance costs for the NTR case correspond to inframarginal
abatement costs by taking the integral of the marginal abatement cost curve.
14 We assume that the risks of emission trading between industrialized countries can be neglected.
15 In Figure 2 we can see that these β-values under VaR correspond to higher α-values under (µ,σ) preferences,
which implies higher risk aversion.
16 Note that all of our quantitative results are readily replicable with the partial equilibrium model as captured
by equations (7) – (12) and the data provided by Table 1 and Table 2.
17 For example, higher initial energy prices due to prevailing taxes require - ceteris paribus - higher carbon
taxes in order to reach the same relative cutback in energy demand.
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Where-flexibility through emission trading across industrialized regions (scenario
CLUB) reduces aggregate compliance costs by roughly 15 % providing a pareto-superior
solution to the NTR scenario.18 Countries whose marginal abatement costs under NTR are
below equalized abatement costs under CLUB export carbon rights, thereby abating more
emissions domestically than are required by their specific reduction target. Likewise,
countries with higher domestic marginal abatement costs will become permit importers
reducing their domestic abatement burden.
Unrestricted where-flexibility under GLOBAL through CDM projects between the
developed world and developing countries will dramatically decrease the overall compliance
costs by more than 70 % vis-à-vis the NTR cost level and about 65 % vis-à-vis the CLUB
level. Direct revenues to developing countries under GLOBAL amount to roughly 8.4 bn
USD. However, these are only the incremental abatement costs from abatement measures.
Including additional FDI that would not have occurred otherwise, total investment flows to
developing countries may be considerably larger (Zhang and Maruyama, 2001). It becomes
clear that the CDM mechanism could provide substantial financial transfers to the developing
world. In total revenue terms, CDM flows under GLOBAL, which are purely determined by
marginal abatement costs and size of mitigation possibilities, will benefit CHN by far the
most, since it disposes over large low-cost abatement options.
Global marginal abatement costs drop to 32 USD per ton of carbon, which is roughly a
third of the CLUB level and falls substantially short of the lowest marginal abatement cost for
purely domestic action of industrialized countries (NTR). As a consequence, all industrialized
countries turn into net importers of emission rights. In total, the domestic abatement share of
the industrialized world is less than 50 % with some countries fulfilling less than 30 % of
their abatement duty through domestic mitigation projects: EUR, e.g., achieves only 29.7 %
of its total abatement requirement of 208 MtC (i.e. 20% of 1040 MtC) domestically.
18 In our partial equilibrium framework, we do not capture terms-of-trade effects that could make a single
country worse off (see Böhringer and Rutherford, 2002).
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Table 3 Economic impacts of carbon abatement
NTR CLUB GLOBAL
A. Marginal abatement costs (in USD/tC)
AUN 74.1 98.2 32.2
CAN 194.6 98.2 32.2
EIT 56.2 98.2 32.2
EUR 169.9 98.2 32.2
FSU 54.5 98.2 32.2
JPN 195.3 98.2 32.2
USA 89.5 98.2 32.2
All others 0 0 32.2
B. Cost of compliance (in million USD)
AUN 789 720 560
CAN 2.699 2.096 895
EIT 984 540 822
EUR 14.922 12.516 5.549
FSU 2.605 1.305 2.221
JPN 5.513 4.261 1.809
USA 13.346 13.242 8.304
AFR 0 0 -675
ASI 0 0 -804
CHN 0 0 -5.372
IND 0 0 -613
MPC 0 0 -447
MSA 0 0 -475
Total 40.858 34.680 11.775
C. Domestic abatement share (in % of total abatement requirement) a
AUN 100 121.6 56.1
CAN 100 60.9 27.1
EIT 100 149.4 66.9
EUR 100 67.0 29.7
FSU 100 148.7 70.1
JPN 100 59.8 26.0
USA 100 106.7 48.8
Total b 100 100 45.6
a Values below 100 % indicate permit imports, values above 100 % indicate permit exports.
b With respect to total industrialized emissions in 2010.
We now turn to the implications of risk in mitigation projects in developing countries,
which are summarized for the second set of scenarios in Table 4. To accommodate a
convenient comparison, the results for scenario GLOBAL that serve as the ‘no-risk’ reference
case are reported again. In general, the accounting of risk should result in a reduction of total
cost savings from CDM projects, since risk premia increase the costs for emission credits
from the investor’s perspective. Consequently, domestic abatement action of industrialized
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countries should rise vis-à-vis the GLOBAL scenario. Country-specific risk premia imply non-
uniform deductions from the (increased) uniform emission market price across CDM
countries (see section A in Table 4). As has been pointed out in Section 3.2, low-risk
countries may benefit from risk considerations at the expense of high-risk countries through
both higher effective prices for carbon credits and more CDM projects compared to the case
GLOBAL. The qualitative reasoning is confirmed by the quantitative results. With higher risk
aversion, the market price for emission credits paid by industrialized countries increases and
is accompanied by a decline in their cost savings from CDM projects and an increase in
domestic action. As to developing countries, low-risk regions MPC and ASI fare better the
more risk-averse investors become, while high-risk countries such as AFR and MSA do
worse. The distribution of gains shows a similar distribution as FDI flows across developing
countries (see Table 1).
However, our quantitative results suggest that the risk-induced changes are relatively
small. If investors are risk-neutral, i.e. for the scenario µ, the changes are close to negligible
(e.g. with respect to country-specific compliance costs changes as compared to GLOBAL are
only as high as 3 % with total compliance costs increased by 2.4 %). When investors decide
according to the mean-variance criterion, the effects compared to GLOBAL are still very
small. Even for α=25, the largest deviation from GLOBAL in country-specific compliance
costs is about 4 % (regions MPC and MSA). The total increase in compliance costs amounts
to 3.2 %.
The implications of risk become more relevant for the VaR scenario. When investors go
for high safety of returns, compliance costs vary between 3 % (AFR, CHN) and 11 % (MPC,
MSA). Total cost of compliance will increase to 10 % above the level of the GLOBAL
scenario. As indicated by the larger differences in marginal abatement costs, we see a
substantial shift in comparative advantage from high-risk countries AFR and MSA to low-risk
countries MPC and ASI. The latter benefit in particular from higher country-specific project
volumes, although the total amount of emission credits across all developing countries has
distinctly declined. Towards higher overall risk perception in project-based emission crediting
with developing countries, the domestic abatement share of industrialized countries increases
from 45.6 % to 48.7 % (VaR, β = 4).
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Table 4 Implications of Investment Risks
GLOBAL µ (µ,σ) VaR
α = β = 0 α = 10 α = 25 β = 2 β = 4
A. Marginal abatement costs (in USD/tC)
AUN 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
CAN 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
EIT 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
EUR 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
FSU 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
JPN 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
USA 32.2 33.0 33.1 33.2 34.1 35.3
AFR 32.2 31.3 31.1 30.8 29.6 27.7
ASI 32.2 32.1 32.1 32.2 32.0 31.9
CHN 32.2 31.6 31.5 31.5 30.8 29.9
IND 32.2 31.0 31.0 31.1 31.1 31.2
MPC 32.2 32.4 32.5 32.6 32.7 33.0
MSA 32.2 31.0 30.2 29.1 27.5 23.7
B. Cost of compliance (in million USD)
AUN 560 569 570 571 581 594
CAN 895 915 917 920 941 970
EIT 822 833 834 836 848 863
EUR 5.549 5.665 5.679 5.700 5.828 6.002
FSU 2.221 2.248 2.251 2.256 2.286 2.324
JPN 1.809 1.848 1.852 1.859 1.902 1.961
USA 8.304 8.451 8.468 8.494 8.653 8.867
AFR -675 -676 -674 -672 -668 -656
ASI -804 -821 -824 -829 -847 -876
CHN -5.372 -5.427 -5.436 -5.451 -5.497 -5.565
IND -613 -608 -611 -615 -631 -656
MPC -447 -462 -464 -467 -480 -500
MSA -475 -474 -467 -457 -451 -423
Total 11.775 12.061 12.095 12.147 12.466 12.904
C. Domestic abatement share (in % of total abatement requirement) a
AUN 56.1 57.1 57.2 57.4 58.4 59.9
CAN 27.1 27.6 27.7 27.8 28.3 29.0
EIT 66.9 68.1 68.3 68.5 69.8 71.6
EUR 29.7 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.9 31.8
FSU 70.1 71.3 71.4 71.6 72.9 74.6
JPN 26.0 26.5 26.5 26.6 27.2 27.9
USA 48.8 49.7 49.8 49.9 50.9 52.1
Total b 45.6 46.4 46.5 46.7 47.5 48.7
a Values below 100 % indicate permit imports, values above 100 % indicate permit exports.
b With respect to total industrialized emissions in 2010.
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5. Sensitivity analysis
We have performed a ‘piecemeal’ sensitivity analysis with respect to the abatement target for
industrialized countries, thereby setting the uniform carbon reduction requirements either at
10 % or 30 %. When emission targets for the industrialized world become more (less)
stringent, marginal abatement costs increase (decrease) and the total domestic abatement
share decreases (increases). Where-flexibility provides higher (lower) overall cost savings,
while compliance costs for industrialized countries as well as benefits from CDM for
developing countries rise (diminish) towards higher (lower) targets. Our central insight on the
relatively small impacts of risk consideration under risk neutrality remains robust: Unless
investors are very risk-averse, changes in the magnitude of compliance costs as well as the
pattern of abatement are rather negligible.
Another issue addressed by our sensitivity analysis refers to the estimation of
investment risks in Section 3.3. To illustrate the sensitivity of results to risk estimates, we
have run two additional sub-scenarios for VaR (β = 4) with a 20 % reduction target where the
mean value is augmented by either a single standard deviation or double that amount. Table 5
summarizes the results. We see that shifts in the assumed default spreads cause substantial
effects. Higher spreads imply substantially higher international prices for emission credits,
and the differences in risk premia across developing countries become much more
pronounced for risk averse investors. The implied shifts in comparative advantage for
undertaking CDM projects now become dramatic for the high-risk region MSA. Only very
cheap CDM projects in MSA remain competitive after risk adjustment, thereby driving down
its trading volume and the associated benefits from CDM close to zero. Although the global
trade in emission credits shrinks, i.e. industrialized countries undertake much more abatement
domestically, low-risk countries such as MPC gain both in terms of increased credit volume
as well as higher prices, since they become relatively safer (more attractive) for investors
from the developed world.
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Table 5 Impacts of higher risk premia
VaR (β = 4 )
Eτi Eτi + iτσ Eτi + 2⋅ iτσ
Marginal abatement costs (in USD/tC)
AUN 35.3 38.9 43.7
CAN 35.3 38.9 43.7
EIT 35.3 38.9 43.7
EUR 35.3 38.9 43.7
FSU 35.3 38.9 43.7
JPN 35.3 38.9 43.7
USA 35.3 38.9 43.7
AFR 27.7 22.5 16.4
ASI 31.9 31.8 31.9
CHN 29.9 27.5 24.7
IND 31.2 31.7 32.6
MPC 33.0 33.8 35.2
MSA 23.7 13.2 0.2
Cost of compliance (in million USD)
AUN 594 629 671
CAN 970 1.052 1.159
EIT 863 901 941
EUR 6.002 6.500 7.144
FSU 2.324 2.420 2.517
JPN 1.961 2.128 2.346
USA 8.867 9.462 10.189
AFR -656 -610 -528
ASI -876 -961 -1.084
CHN -5.565 -5.733 -5.934
IND -656 -731 -841
MPC -500 -562 -651
MSA -423 -310 -21
Total 12.904 14.185 15.909
Domestic abatement share (in % of total abatement requirement) a
AUN 59.9 64.0 69.4
CAN 29.0 31.1 33.9
EIT 71.6 76.7 83.4
EUR 31.8 34.1 37.1
FSU 74.6 79.6 86.1
JPN 27.9 30.1 32.7
USA 52.1 55.8 60.5
Total b 48.7 52.1 56.6
a Values below 100 % indicate permit imports, values above 100 % indicate permit exports.
b With respect to total industrialized emissions in 2010.
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6. Conclusions
We have investigated how risk considerations affect the economic implications of emission
crediting. Our quantitative results show that the incorporation of country-specific investment
risks induces rather small changes to the magnitude and distribution of benefits from project-
based emission trading vis-à-vis a situation where investment risks are neglected.
If investors go for high safety of returns, however, there is a noticeable decline in the
overall volume of emission crediting and the associated total economic benefits. Differences
in risk across developing countries then become more pronounced with converse implications
for high-risk and low-risk developing countries. While low-risk developing countries attract
higher project volumes and benefit from higher effective prices per emission credit compared
to a reference scenario without risk, the opposite applies to high-risk countries. The -
politically undesired – shift in comparative advantage of emission abatement against high-
risk, typically least-developed, countries may become dramatic if risk-averse investors
perceive large differences in project-based risks across countries. In this case, only very cheap
mitigation projects in high-risk countries will be realized, driving down the respective
country’s benefits from emission crediting to the advantage of low-risk developing countries.
This simulated pattern of regional imbalance is confirmed by the empirical evidence for
activities implemented jointly (AIJ) that have been undertaken so far under the pilot phase of
the Kyoto Protocol: Of the 152 AIJ projects in 2001, 85 have been concentrated in Latin
America and Caribbean, 39 in Economies in Transition, 19 in the Asia and Pacific region, and
only 9 in Africa (UNFCCC, 2001).
Our simulation results indicate the importance of risk reduction measures in countries
with high project risks. Such measures may include contractual agreements, financial project
design, and insurance and guarantees by private and public institutions (Zhang and
Maruyama, 2001; Dailamy and Leipziger, 1999). In addition, public funds, such as official
development assistance and Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds, may be used to
mitigate country risks associated with climate-friendly project investment and to counteract
the risk-ridden shifts in mitigation projects across developing countries.
In our analysis, we have not investigated to what extent the asymmetric distribution of
risks may affect global efficiency of ‘where’-flexibility for alternative initial distributions of
abatement duties. As with transaction costs, permit market equilibrium and aggregate
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compliance costs will not be independent from the initial permit allocation (Montero, 1997;
Stavins, 1995). This aspect is of potential importance with respect to future (Post-Kyoto)
GHG abatement policies, which may include stringent emission reduction targets for the
industrialized world as well as the developing world. We plan to address this issue in future
research work.
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